The Borno Model: How Quranic Oaths and Community Reintegration Aim to Prevent Terrorist Relapse

The Borno State Government has moved to allay public fears that repentant insurgents who have completed rehabilitation and deradicalisation programs may return to violence. Officials assert that the state’s comprehensive framework—widely known as the “Borno Model”—incorporates strict traditional and religious safeguards that make relapse highly unlikely.

Understanding the Borno Model: A Multi-Layered Approach to Deradicalisation

The Borno Model is not a single intervention but a holistic process that combines psychological counselling, vocational training, religious re-education, and community reintegration. At its core lies a deeply symbolic and spiritually binding ritual: the swearing of an oath on the Holy Quran. This act is designed to leverage the profound religious convictions of former fighters, many of whom were radicalised using distorted interpretations of Islamic texts.

According to the State Commissioner for Women Affairs and Social Development, Zuwaira Gambo, the oath is the final step in a rigorous process. “When they come to us through all the processes of the Borno model, the last thing they do is, they take an oath with the Quran. Once you swear by the Quran, you know the implication,” Gambo explained in an interview with NewsCentral Television.

This spiritual commitment is intended to serve as a powerful deterrent. In a region where religious identity is paramount, breaking a Quranic oath is considered not just a legal failure but a moral and spiritual transgression with severe consequences in the afterlife. This cultural and theological weight is what the government believes makes the oath a more effective guarantee than any written contract or parole agreement.

Addressing the Risk of Relapse: “Dead on Arrival”

Commissioner Gambo directly addressed the skepticism surrounding the program, acknowledging that while some former fighters might attempt to return to the bush, the consequences would be swift and severe. “People assume that they will go back to the bush; well, they may, but they are dead on arrival. So, it is not even about whether they have been certified or we trust them or not. The law of the jungle takes care of that,” she stated.

This statement highlights a pragmatic, if harsh, reality: former insurgents who rejoin militant groups are often viewed with suspicion by their former commanders, who may see them as potential informants or security risks. The Borno Model thus relies on a dual deterrent—spiritual consequences from the oath and the practical dangers of re-entering a violent ecosystem.

Operational Challenges: The Funding Gap

Despite the program’s ambitious design, Gambo acknowledged significant operational hurdles, most notably funding constraints. “The challenge, of course, has to do with funding, because you bring a lot of people on board, but how are you going to feed them, how are you going to clothe and provide for them with necessary access to education,” she noted.

This funding gap has real-world implications. Without adequate resources, the program cannot provide sustained vocational training, mental health support, or the basic necessities that help former fighters build stable, peaceful lives. Inadequate reintegration support increases the risk of recidivism, as individuals may struggle to find legitimate livelihoods and become vulnerable to re-radicalisation.

Related

National Debate: Operation Safe Corridor and the Reintegration of 744 Former Insurgents

The Commissioner’s comments come amid a renewed national debate over Nigeria’s broader deradicalisation efforts under Operation Safe Corridor. This federal program recently graduated and planned the reintegration of 744 former insurgents into society. According to earlier reports, 597 of these beneficiaries were from Borno State, while others came from Adamawa, Yobe, Kano, and other parts of the country.

The development has triggered widespread public concern over transparency, victim compensation, and security risks. Critics argue that without clear accountability, the program risks alienating communities that have suffered immense trauma at the hands of Boko Haram and other militant groups.

Legal and Human Rights Perspectives

Afam Osigwe, President of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), warned that while reintegration is not inherently wrong, the process must be transparent and sensitive to victims of violence. “Reintegrating persons who may have unleashed violence or burned properties or committed other criminal activities into communities without addressing the hurt of the victims would appear as compensating perpetrators while overlooking the victims,” he said.

Osigwe’s comments underscore a critical tension: how to balance the need for peace and reconciliation with the demand for justice. Without a parallel process of victim acknowledgment and compensation, reintegration can feel like impunity to affected communities.

Isa Sanusi, Country Director of Amnesty International Nigeria, echoed these concerns, urging the government to improve transparency around the identities and roles of those being reintegrated. “There are serious concerns that some of those called repentant sometimes go back to what they do. The government must be transparent about who they are and their level of involvement,” Sanusi said.

He added: “Tell the people who these people are, what kind of terrorism they were involved in, and whether they were informants or killers. These things have to be made very clear.”

Practical Implications and Recommendations

For the Borno Model to succeed on a larger scale, several key areas require attention:

• Transparency: Public disclosure of the criteria for selecting participants, the nature of their past involvement, and the monitoring mechanisms in place post-reintegration.
• Victim-Centred Justice: Establishing a formal process for victim compensation, community dialogue, and restorative justice to rebuild trust.
• Sustained Funding: Securing long-term financial commitments from federal, state, and international partners to ensure comprehensive support—including education, healthcare, and livelihood training—for former fighters and their families.
• Independent Oversight: Creating a multi-stakeholder oversight body that includes civil society, religious leaders, and human rights organisations to monitor the program’s implementation and outcomes.

Conclusion

The Borno Model represents a bold and culturally attuned approach to one of Nigeria’s most intractable security challenges. By combining spiritual commitment with practical reintegration, it offers a potential pathway from violence to peace. However, its long-term success will depend on addressing the funding gaps, ensuring transparency, and—most importantly—centering the needs and voices of the victims who have borne the brunt of the conflict.